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Abstract
Germany’s large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against
the backdrop of the Eurozone crisis where the burden of adjustment was borne almost
entirely by the crisis countries. We argue that Germany’s resistance to reduce itsmassive
current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive
struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. In contrast, interstate ﬁnanc-
ing – such as granting bailouts to crisis countries – is much less controversial, turning
it into a politically more expedient choice. Using evidence from original survey data
from ūŭů German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group
representatives and policymakers in Germany, and data from public opinion surveys,
we show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German
interest groups, they disagree heavily about which speciﬁc policies should be imple-
mented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to
avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns ﬁnancing into the politically
most aĴractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas
or Germany’s export-oriented structure, distributive conﬂicts contribute signiﬁcantly to
Germany’s resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. This phenomenon can
also be observed in other surplus countries, as a brief analysis of interest group dynam-
ics in Austria and the Netherlands shows.
Working Paper, May ŬŪūŲ
ū Introduction
Germany’s massive current account surplus has been widely criticized in recent years. By
exporting more than it imports and saving more than it consumes and invests at home, the
country has accumulated the world’s largest current-account surplus, reaching almost Ų%
of its GDP in ŬŪūű (IMF, ŬŪūŰ). Even though there is considerable debate among economists
about the sources and possible remedies to the German current account surplus (e.g. Koll-
man et al., ŬŪūů) Germany faces considerable political pressure to rebalance its current ac-
count. International policymakers such as the French president, the director of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the head of the ECB, and the US president have decried the German
current account surplus as ”unbearable”ū, a ”serious threat”Ŭ, an ”unresolved issue”ŭ and
quite simply ”very bad.”Ů Germany’s apparent unwillingness to adjust its domestic policies
in an eﬀort reduce the surplus has been criticized especially against the backdrop of the Eu-
rozone crisis, in which the burden of adjustment has been borne almost entirely by the crisis
countries (Blyth, ŬŪūŭ; Wolf, ŬŪūŭ; Eichengreen, ŬŪūű; Frieden andWalter, ŬŪūű). During the
crisis, an expansion of German domestic demand could have helped crisis countries by cre-
ating additional export opportunities and countering the deﬂationary pressures within the
union as a whole. Although the size of these possible spill-overs remains contested (Capo-
rale and Girardi, ŬŪūŭ; Blanchard et al., ŬŪūű), Germany resisted political pressure to share
the adjustment costs in the Eurocrisis. More generally, despite the mounting international
pressure, the German government has done liĴle to implement policies designed to spur
domestic demand and investment (IMF, ŬŪūŰ).
This lack of adjustment is puzzling for a number of reasons. Although some argue that
Germany has no direct economic interest in reducing the surplus (e.g. Felbermayr et al.,
ŬŪūű), the perceived lack of public and private investment in Germany has fueled heated
debates over the country’s ”investment gap” and ability to sustain future growth (Bach
et al., ŬŪūŭ; Südekum and Felbmayr, ŬŪūű). The surplus also leaves the country exposed
to negative economic and political developments abroad. For one, Germany’s high export-
dependence leaves the country vulnerable to economic crises abroad . Moreover, because a
ūBloomberg (ŬŪūű), ”France’s Macron Says German Trade Surplus Harmful to EU Economy”, ūű.ŪŮ.ūű.
ŬIMF (ŬŪūű): ”Transcript of an Interview with IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde with the Leading
European Newspapers Association”, ŬŪ.ŪŮ.ūű.
ŭECB (ŬŪūű): ”Press Conference with Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, ų March ŬŪūű.”
ŮCNBC(ŬŪūű): ”Trump reportedly calls Germans ‘very bad’”, ŬŰ.Ūů.ūű.
ū
current account surplus is always associatedwith net capital outﬂows, German investments
abroad are exposed to ﬁnancial crises and value losses abroad (Baldi and Bremer, ŬŪūů;
IMF, ŬŪūű; Krebs and Scheﬀel, ŬŪūű). This is particularly true to the extent that global or
regional imbalances and the credit booms they fuel have often been a key driver of balance-
of-payments crises (Schularick and Taylor, ŬŪūŬ). In the Eurozone crisis, for example, the
countries with the biggest current account deﬁcits were hardest hit by the crisis (Johnston
et al., ŬŪūŮ; Wihlborg et al., ŬŪūŪ; Baldwin and Giavazzi, ŬŪūů) and German banks were
heavily exposed to the risk of a default in deﬁcit states (Bibow, ŬŪūŭ; Vermeiren, ŬŪūŮ). In
political terms, Germany’s surplus has fueled resentment on the part of deﬁcit countries,
pressure by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the
European Commission, and, perhaps most threatening to Germany, protectionist impulses
among major trading partners such as the United States. This has created incentives to re-
duce the current account surplus that go beyond a purely economic rationale. Nonetheless,
Germany has not engaged in large-scale macroeconomic adjustment designed to reduce the
current account surplus.
This paper takes this puzzle as the starting point and examineswhyGerman policymak-
ers have resisted a substantial rebalancing of the current account, especially in the context
of the Eurozone crisis. We are of course not the ﬁrst to examine this issue. Two existing
explanations dominate the literature and the public debate. The ﬁrst emphasizes the im-
portance of ordoliberal economic ideas in German (and other surplus country) policy cir-
cles and the wider public (MaĴhijs, ŬŪūŰa; Dullien and Guérot, ŬŪūŬ; Young, ŬŪūŮ; Bulmer,
ŬŪūŮ; Wendler, ŬŪūŮ). These strongly-held beliefs about the axiomatic merits of prudent
ﬁscal policies and limited state involvement in the economy have shaped the way policy-
makers interpret policy problems such as the Eurozone crisis. They also provided German
decision-makers with a clear instruction sheet for how to deal with the crisis: deﬁcit states
needed to reform their economies to bring down public debt and regain competitiveness,
any provision of ﬁnancial help needed to be linked to tight conditions to avoidmoral hazard
andmost importantly, a reduction of imbalances by engaging in less ﬁscal discipline and/or
stimulating growth and inﬂation in surplus countries would only risk their hard-earned
standing on international markets and endanger price-stability (MaĴhijs and McNamara,
ŬŪūů; MaĴhijs, ŬŪūŰa; Young, ŬŪūŮ; Schäfer, ŬŪūŰ). The moralizing framing of the Eurozone
crisis as a debt crisis (e.g. Wendler, ŬŪūŮ) and emphasis onmaintaining a balanced budget is
Ŭ
seen as evidence for the dominant inﬂuence of ordoliberal ideas on German policymaking.
Many authors therefore suggest that adherence to these ideas rather than material interests
shaped surplus countries’ behavior in the Eurozone crisis, with some even suggesting that
the German crisis response went against Germany’s economic self-interest (MaĴhijs, ŬŪūŰa;
Young, ŬŪūŮ). This contrasts with the second dominant explanation for Germany’s resis-
tance to rebalance, which is rooted in the literature on comparative capitalisms (Hall and
Soskice, ŬŪŪū; Baccaro and Pontusson, ŬŪūŰ) and focuses on the structural importance of the
export sector for the German economy. This structural perspective holds that the need to
preserve shelter the competitiveness of German export sectors created a large coalition of
policymakers, employers and workers opposed to measures that would expand domestic
demand, lead to higher inﬂation, and a rise of the domestic wage level (Thompson, ŬŪūů;
Leupold, ŬŪūů; Mahnkopf, ŬŪūŬ; Schimmelfennig, ŬŪūůa; Höpner and LuĴer, ŬŪūŮa). At the
same time, the German growth model relies on a stable monetary union and beneﬁts from
a situation in which the German real exchange rate is structurally weaker than it would be
if Germany returned to a national currency citepStreeckŬŪūůa, HallŬŪūŬ, LeupoldŬŪūů. Be-
cause Germany and other surplus countries wanted to preserve their growth model while
at the same time safeguarding the Eurozone, adjustment was consequently pushed on to
the crisis countries (Hall, ŬŪūŬ).
Both of these approaches provide valuable insights into the sources of the German sur-
plus, yet they also leave open some question marks. For one, both of these dominant expla-
nations paint a picture of Germany as being united in its resistance towardsmacroeconomic
adjustment, either because of the dominance of ordoliberal ideas or because safeguarding
the export-led growth model constitutes the national interest. Yet adjustment politics in
surplus countries generate signiﬁcant domestic distributive conﬂicts (Frieden and Walter,
ŬŪūű), analogous to the distributive struggles that characterize balance of payments adjust-
ment in deﬁcit countries (Eichengreen, ūųųŬ; Simmons, ūųųű; Walter, ŬŪūŭ). It is not obvi-
ous, for example, why labor unions representingworkers in the non-tradables sector should
support wage restraint against the backdrop of a record andwidely criticized trade surplus.
And indeed, as we will show below, the policy preferences of diﬀerent economic groups
in Germany diﬀer considerably. By assuming a homogenous national interest or national
economic ideology, the existing approaches cannot account for these diﬀerences and their
inﬂuence on German policymaking. Second, the existing approaches concentrate predom-
ŭ
inantly on ﬁscal and monetary policy as well as wage-seĴing issues. Macroeconomic ad-
justment decisions are, however, multidimensional. The German decision not to adjust has
signiﬁcant consequences abroad, which puts the stability of the Eurozone in question and
increases the ﬁnancing needs of those countries running large current account deﬁcits, espe-
cially those facing diﬃculties of meeting these demands by enough private capital inﬂows.
Understanding why Germany opted not to adjust internally, thus also requires understand-
ing how German decision-makers evaluated these alternatives relative to the option of im-
plementing domestic policies designed to reduce the current account surplus.
Our paper contributes to such an improved understanding of German policymaking by
focusing on studying the drivers of Germany’s policy responses to the Eurozone crisis. Our
paper starts from the insight that severe balance-of-payments imbalances were a key cause
of the Eurozone crisis (Jones, ŬŪūů; Lane, ŬŪūŭ; Obstfeld, ŬŪūŬ; Baldwin et al., ŬŪūů; Frieden
and Walter, ŬŪūű). For surplus countries, there are three ways of responding to such a cri-
sis: external adjustment, internal adjustment and the ﬁnancing of imbalances (Frieden and
Walter, ŬŪūű; Pepinsky, ŬŪūŮ). We argue that economic interest groups in surplus countries
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in how much they are helped or hurt by each of the available policy
options, and therefore also vary in their evaluation of these options. Rather than reﬂect-
ing a uniform preference for ﬁnancing, we argue that Germany’s resistance against internal
macroeconomic adjustment is rooted in the distributive struggles about the design of pos-
sible adjustment policies that result from these diﬀerences. Internal adjustment is likely to
be particularly contentious, because it can be implemented in many diﬀerent ways, many
of which beneﬁt some groups, but hurt others. As a result, even in situations in which there
is general support for strengthening domestic demand, there is likely to be disagreement
about how to achieve that goal, making internal adjustment politically diﬃcult. Together
with a broad elite and popular consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, the political
diﬃculties of forging a consensus on how to reduce the current account surplus make in-
terstate ﬁnancing a politically aĴractive strategy. This is especially true when the resistance
to such a strategy is low, or when there is a consensus on the preferred ﬁnancing strategy.
We examine this argument using original survey data from ūŭů German economic inter-
est groups, ﬁrst-hand qualitative interviewswith German policy-makers and interest-group
representatives, as well as public opinion data. We show that crisis policy preferences in
Germany are much more diverse and that internal adjustment is viewed much more pos-
Ů
itively than both the ideas-based and the growth-model argument suggest. However, we
also show that diﬀerent types of interest groups, such as employer associations, trade unions
and social policy groups, vary signiﬁcantly in their support for and opposition to the speciﬁc
policies that could be implemented to internally rebalance the current account. Whereas a
large majority of interest groups supports internal adjustment via policies that are to their
advantage, support drops signiﬁcantly when internal adjustment involves policies to which
they are opposed, whereas support for ﬁnancing increases. Because interest groups also
view ﬁnancing as a much less salient issue and because the public shared interest groups’
resistance to a break-up of the Eurozone, ﬁnancing is the politically more expedient alterna-
tive. Our analysis also shows that these dynamics can be equally observed in other Eurozone
surplus countries, such as in Austria and the Netherlands.
By demonstrating that the German export surplus is less structural than existing ap-
proaches recognize, our paper suggests that a rebalancing of the German current account is
not impossible. Rather, it will be necessary to design a policy mix that appeals to a broader
coalition of interest groups. Our results also suggest that as the costs of the alternatives –
a breakup of the Eurozone, ﬁnancing of deﬁcit countries, or even retaliatory and protec-
tionist reactions by other countries – rise, support for internal adjustment is likely to grow.
More generally, our paper shows that distributive struggles underlie the political stickiness
of large current-account surpluses and thus adds to our understanding of the persistence of
balance- of-payment imbalances at the global level.
Ŭ Distributional Conﬂicts and the Politics of Non-Adjustment
We argue that non-adjustment in the face of a large current account surplus is rooted in dis-
tributional conﬂicts about the speciﬁc design of internal adjustment and the aĴractiveness of
the alternatives, external adjustment and ﬁnancing. Although most economic actors could
beneﬁt from some internal adjustmentmeasures to expand the economy, most of thesemea-
sures also inﬂict substantial costs on others. The resulting polarization in opinions about
how internal adjustment should be achieved, makes internal adjustment politically costly.
Because ﬁnancing tends to be a less divisive policy, it presents itself as a politically more
viable option than internal adjustment.
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Ŭ.ū Strategies in Balance-of-Payment Crises
The Euro crisis is at it’s heart a balance-of-payment crisis. Though the question how these
imbalances accrued is still subject to some debate, a broad consensus has emerged, that the
economic problems of the Eurozone eventually manifested themselves in severe balance-
of-payment issues (Jones, ŬŪūů; Lane, ŬŪūŭ; Obstfeld, ŬŪūŬ; Baldwin et al., ŬŪūů; Frieden and
Walter, ŬŪūű). For surplus countries, there are three ways of responding to such a crisis: ex-
ternal adjustment, internal adjustment and the ﬁnancing of imbalances (Frieden andWalter,
ŬŪūű; Pepinsky, ŬŪūŮ). External adjustment is usually achieved through adapting the nomi-
nal exchange rate. An appreciation of the exchange rate increases the price of domestically
produced relative to foreign goods, stimulates imports and thus leads to a reduction of the
surplus (Frieden, ŬŪūŮ). Of course, if imbalances arise within a monetary union, a change
or relative exchange rates requires (at least a partial) break up of that union. For surplus
countries in the Eurozone, external adjustment would thus not only mean to accept that
some members leave the common currency but also the uncertainty and potential ﬁnancial
turmoil caused by such steps. A second strategy to rebalance the current account is inter-
nal adjustment, in which relative price levels are adjusted through macroeconomic demand
management. In order to reduce surpluses, governments in this scenario spur domestic
demand and allow wages to rise which leads to more imports and a reduction of the ex-
port overhang. However, what is important about internal adjustment is that, at the policy
level, it can be achieved through various ways. Policymakers who want to increase domes-
tic demand could as much step up public investment in infrastructure and schools as they
could reduce corporate taxes and cut red tape for businesses to incentive private invest-
ment (Bernanke, ŬŪūů). Similarly, they could raise the minimum wage, increase pensions,
or expand unemployment beneﬁts (Eichengreen, ūųųŬ). While all these measures should in
theory contribute to the macroeconomic goal of more imports and less exports, their distri-
butional implications of course diﬀer widely.
Finally, surplus countries can resort to ﬁnancing. In this scenario, they refrain from ad-
justing their own economic policies and instead render deﬁcit countries with the means to
sustain their current account deﬁcits (Copelovitch and Enderlein, ŬŪūŰ). Again, there are
multiple forms of ﬁnancing. Surplus countries can choose to directly transfer resources to
deﬁcit countries, either through once-oﬀ bailouts or, in the case of a monetary union, by im-
Ű
plementing more institutionalized transfers such as joined automatic stabilizers. Transfers
can also occur through the banking sector by seĴing out a debt relief for deﬁcit countries
or through monetary policies as higher inﬂation rates help deﬁcit countries to deleverage
and at the same redistribute from savers (mainly in surplus countries) to debtors (mainly
in deﬁcit countries). Of course, all these measures are costly. As often pointed, transfers,
credits and debt relieves either put surplus countries’ ’tax payers’ money at risk or use it
directly to ease crisis pressures. However, compared to internal adjustment policies, the
distributional consequences of ﬁnancing are much less clear cut. At some point, some tax
payers will have to pick up the bill. But which taxpayers and at what in point in time re-
mains an open question when ﬁnancing policies are implemented. As Frieden and Walter
(ŬŪūű) put it, ”balance-of-payment crises thus confront policymakers with a list of unaĴrac-
tive options.” However, it is also important to note that while diﬀerent forms of internal
adjustment produce clear cut winners and losers, the costs of ﬁnancing are much more ab-
stract and dispersed and are likely to emerge at a distant point in time. As we show below,
this has important implications for the politics of adjustment in surplus countries.
Ŭ.Ŭ Trade-Oﬀs, Vulnerability Proﬁles and Adjustment Politics
We assume that diﬀerent economic actors form their preferences with regards to crisis man-
agement based on the trade-oﬀs they make between the material costs and beneﬁts of the
three adjustment strategies outlined above. Building on Walter’s (ŬŪŪŲ; ŬŪūŭ; ŬŪūŰ) work
on adjustment politics in deﬁcit countries, we conceptualize these trade-oﬀs as ”vulnerabil-
ity proﬁles” that can be used to deduce testable hypotheses about the interests of diﬀerent
actors.
Figure ū illustrates ideal type vulnerability proﬁles with regard to internal and external
adjustment as well as corresponding preferences. Actors situated in quadrant ū are vulner-
able to expansionary domestic policies but would beneﬁt from higher exchange rates or a
break-up of the Eurozone and should thus prefer external adjustment over any other form
of crisis management. The opposite is true for actors displaying vulnerabilities that fall into
quadrant ŭ. These groups would gain from a boom in domestic demand and lose from an
appreciation of their currency. They are thus expected to favour internal adjustment over a
break-up or ﬁnancing. Quadrant Ŭ depicts the situation for actors that are highly vulnerable
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FієѢџђ ₁: Figure ū - Vulnerability proﬁles and adjustment preferences
to internal as well as external adjustment. These groups would be harmed both by domestic
inﬂation and by a change in the composition of the monetary union. We thus expect these
actors to be willing to provide deﬁcit countries with some form of ﬁnancing.
Assuming that actors base their preferences on trade-oﬀs between the costs and ben-
eﬁts of diﬀerent strategies thus results in straight-forward predictions about what crisis
responses they favour. However, as outlined above, the costs and beneﬁts of internal ad-
justment very much depend on the policies that it consists of. Figure Ŭ illustrates what this
means for the preferences of economic actors. It shows the vulnerability proﬁles of two styl-
ized groups - one trade union and one employer association. First, let’s assume that both
groups would lose from the uncertainty and turmoil linked to a break-up of the Eurozone.
They are thus situated on the right-hand side of the proﬁle. Whether they prefer internal
adjustment or ﬁnancing is now policy speciﬁc. In Panel A, internal adjustment is achieved
through raising the minimumwage. Assuming that a signiﬁcant number of members of the
trade union would beneﬁt from this, we would expect the group to champion internal ad-
justment. On the other hand, the employer association would clearly lose from this form of
expanding domestic demand - especially if it represents ﬁrms that rely on low-paidworkers.
This puts the group in quadrant II. Being vulnerable to both a break-up and the speciﬁc form
of internal adjustment on the table, it prefers the much more abstract costs of ﬁnancing as a
crisis strategy. The picture changes in a scenario in which policymakers decide to achieve
more domestic demand by reducing corporate taxes in order to increase private investment
Ų
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FієѢџђ ₂: Figure Ŭ - Stylized examples: group-proﬁles depend on policy design
(Panel B). Now, the trade union, wanting to avoid the redistributive eﬀects of tax cuts for
businesses, champions ﬁnancing, whereas the employer association turns into a proponent
of internal adjustment.
The fact that preferences towards internal adjustment are policy speciﬁc has important
political implications. To have a meaningful eﬀect on the current-account macro, internal
adjustment requires concerted eﬀorts over a broad spectrum of policy ﬁelds. As Figure Ŭ
illustrates, the distributional conﬂicts surrounding internal adjustment means that policy-
makers that want to pursue this strategy, will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to build a coalition to back
it up. While every policy they propose will garner support from some groups, it will also
provoke ﬁerce opposition from others. At the same time, we expect distributional conﬂicts
about diﬀerent ﬁnancing policies to be less pronounced. While there multiple ways of im-
plementing interstate transfers, its diﬃcult to predict who exactly is going to have to pay
the costs of these policies, independent of their speciﬁc design. Assuming that a majority of
groups want to avoid a break-up, this makes ﬁnancing, where costs are more abstract, more
dispersed and less well-known, the politically more viable alternative.
These arguments have a four main empirical implications. First, many economic actors
should ﬁnd some forms of internal adjustment aĴractive. As long as domestic expansion is
achieved through policies that beneﬁt their material interests (i.e. if actors are situated in
quadrant III or IV), we expect interest groups to prefer internal adjustment over ﬁnancing or
a break-up of the union. Second, however, we also expect economic actors to be polarized
about how to adjust internally. As vulnerabilities to internal adjustment are policy speciﬁc,
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many groups should support some forms of it but also ﬁercely reject others. We propose
that this polarization makes it diﬃcult to build a coherent coalition in favour of rebalancing
the current account. Third, while we expect internal adjustment to be subject to distribu-
tional conﬂicts, similar conﬂicts should be less pronounced when it comes to ﬁnancing. The
long-term costs of interstate transfers are more opaque and less well known. For interest
groups they should therefore be of liĴle political salience. Against this background, ﬁnally,
we expect ﬁnancing to be the an ”easy out” for groups that want to avoid both a break-
up and internal adjustment. The more vulnerable groups are to speciﬁc forms of internal
adjustment suggested to them, the more likely they should be to support ﬁnancing.
ŭ Research Design and Data
To understand what drove the preferences of German economic actors in the Eurocrisis and
how these preferences translated into politics, we combine an analysis of original survey
data with in-depths qualitative interviews with German interest-group representatives and
policy-makers. Focusing our analysis on economic interest groups such as trade unions
and employer associations comes with several advantages. First, these groups are central
actors in economic policy making (Hall and Soskice, ŬŪŪū; Thelen, ŬŪūŬ). Especially in coor-
dinated market economies such as Germany, economic interest groups are deeply involved
in political decisions concerning the functioning of the economy (e.g. Paster, ŬŪūŬ) and their
concerns have been identiﬁed as crucial framework conditions in Germany’s approach to
the Euro crisis (Hall, ŬŪūŬ; Armingeon and Baccaro, ŬŪūů). Second, besides being substan-
tially important in their own rights, economic interest groups also render crucial clues to
their members and the broader public. Economic crises are complex events. To navigate
these crises and to form their own preferences with regards to it, citizens therefore turn to
political intermediaries for information and interpretation (McdermoĴ, ŬŪŪŰ; Kim andMar-
galit, ŬŪūŰ). Economic interest groups therefore not only represent important interests but
are also likely to shape a wide range of preferences with regards to the Eurocrisis.
To examine our predictions about the drivers of group-level preferences, we therefore
use original data from an online-survey amongst interest groups registered at the German
Bundestag. Selecting groups from the Bundestag register ensures that they have preferences
with regards to policies at the national level and fulﬁl a minimum requirement of organi-
ūŪ
zational and political capacities. The register lists a total number of ŬŬŬŲ interest groups.
We focus on ”sectional interest groups” (Giger and Klüver, ŬŪūŰ), i.e. groups that represent
the interest of a relatively well-deﬁned subset of societal interests and we disregard groups
that do not engage in economic or social policy-issues such as environmental groups, civil
right, criminal, family-issue groups and the like. We also ignore small groups with less than
ůŪŪ members. This leaves us with a total number of ŮŲŲ groups that were contacted via two
waves of emails and subsequent reminder phone calls. The surveys took place between
September and December ŬŪūŰ.ů ūŭŰ groups participated in the survey corresponding to a
response rate of about ŬŲ percent. This falls well into the typical range of response rates for
interest group surveys (MarcheĴi, ŬŪūů). Of these groups, ůŰ percent are employer associa-
tions, ŭŬ percent are professional associations, ű percent are trade unions and ů percent are
social policy groups. This picture ﬁts population of groups representing business interests
in the lobby register as well as themore diversiﬁed organizational set-up of business groups
in Germany (Dür and Mateo, ŬŪūŭ).
To complement this analysis, we furthermore conducted ūŮ in-depths interviews with
interest-group representatives and policy-makers inGermany. Themain goal of our conver-
sations with interest-group representatives was to understand what motivated their prefer-
enceswith regards to themanagement of the crisis and how they pursued these interests po-
litically. We selected groups based on two criteria: ﬁrst, their size and the relevance of their
members for the overall economy. Second, we chose a set of groups that represented a wide
range of sectors including manufacturing and services, domestic- and export-oriented asso-
ciations and trade unions including members with diﬀerent levels of income. Furthermore,
we conducted interviews with policy-makers that were directly involved in decisions con-
cerning the management of the crisis, including oﬃcials of the responsible departments in
the ﬁnanceministry and theministry for economic aﬀairs and themajor parties’ rapporteurs
for the crisis in the German Bundestag. We conducted all interviews between November Ŭű
and December Ų, ŬŪūű in Berlin. A complete list can be found in the appendix.
ůA key assumption interest group surveys rely on is that individuals answering the questionnaire reﬂect
organizational positions rather their personal views. Tomake sure that respondents are knowledgeable enough
to do so, we sent personal invitations either to the heads of specialized divisions such as economics, social policy
or international aﬀairs or to chief executives or board members. Furthermore, the phrasing of the questions
throughout the survey constantly reminds respondents to answer with respect to their organizational positions.
ūū
ŭ.ū Dependent Variable: Policy Preferences and Adjustment Choices
Our main dependent variable of interest is how German economic interest groups viewed
the policy choices available in the Eurocrisis and which policies they prefer if pressed to
choose. We construct this variable in two steps. First, we ask respondents to rank diﬀerent
policy options from within each strategy from their most to their least preferred option.
Table ū provides an overview of the diﬀerent options respondentswere asked to rankwithin
each strategy.
Internal Adjustment Policies Financing Policies External Adjustment Policies
Public infrastructure spending Provision of Emergency Credits Deﬁcit countries leave the EMU
Higher minimum wage ECB bond purchases EMU divides into North and South Block
Public spending on welfare European Unemployment Insurance Germany leaves the EMU
Decreasing VAT Haircuts on public sector debts
Decreasing corporate taxes Haircuts on private sector debts
Tюяљђ ₁: Overview of policy options in diﬀerent adjustment strategies in the survey
We then use these rankings to build adjustment packages that represent stylized forms of
internal adjustment, external adjustment and ﬁnancing and ask respondents to choose their
preferred strategy amongst them. As discussed above, each strategy can be implemented in
very diﬀerent ways. Since we are especially interested in how preferences change depend-
ing on the speciﬁc policy content of the diﬀerent strategies, we ask respondents to select
their preferred adjustment strategy twice. For their ﬁrst choice, each set of strategies con-
tains each group’s most preferred options from within each strategy. If respondents, for
example, state that of the diﬀerent options for internal adjustment they liked public invest-
ment and a reduction of corporate taxes the best, they have to chose between these policies
and their most liked options of external adjustment and ﬁnancing. In a second step, the task
is repeated but respondents now are confronted with adjustment strategies containing their
least-liked policy options from within each strategy. The same respondent as above, for
example, now has to choose between an increase of the minimum wage and more welfare
spending as her least-liked form of internal adjustment, verses her most disliked form of
ﬁnancing an a Eurozone break-up. As a single form of internal adjustment or ﬁnancing is
likely to be insuﬃcient for stabilizing the union, these packages each contain two policies
ūŬ
FієѢџђ ₃: Figure ŭ - Example Question on preferred adjustment strategy. Policies marked with as-
terisks are subject to previous ranking of policies within each strategy. A = internal adjustment; B =
external adjustment; C = ﬁnancing.
fromwithin their respective strategies. To get at the trade-oﬀs groups make between diﬀer-
ent strategies, each package furthermore lists the implications that following one adjustment
strategy has with regards to the others (e.g. choosing ﬁnancing as a strategy means not to
engage in stimulating policies at home while at the same time allowing all member states to
remain in the monetary union). Figure ŭ presents an example for the choice interest groups
are asked to make. We thus arrive at two sets of categorical dependent variables, one rep-
resenting the respondents decision with regards to the adjustment strategies containing his
most-liked policies, the other measuring preferences when each crisis management strategy
lists her least-liked options.
Figure Ů shows the distribution of adjustment choices. When confronted with choices
between packages that contain their favoured policies from within each strategy (left-hand
panel), Űű percent pick internal adjustment as their favoured option, ūŲ percent go for ﬁnanc-
ing and only ūŭ percent chose their most-liked form of a Euro zone break-up. The picture
changes when respondents have to choose between strategies containing their least-liked
policies. The share of respondents choosing internal adjustment. goes down to Ŭų percent.
Ŭű percent of the groups now pick their least-liked form of ﬁnancing and only Ů percent go
for their least-liked scenario of a Euro zone break-up. Evidence that trade-oﬀs are much
harder in cases in which respondents are forced to choose between their least-liked forms
of the diﬀerent strategies can also be seen in the fact that ŭų percent of the groups refused
to take a stance by answering ”Don’t know”.
ūŭ
FієѢџђ ₄: Figure Ů -Share of respondents choosing each adjustment strategy as their preferred crisis
response; Panel A (left-hand side) displays choices between packages containing the respondent’s
most-liked policies within each strategy; Panel B (right-hand side) shows choices between strategies
with least-liked policies
ŭ.Ŭ Independent Variables: Measuring Policy-Speciﬁc Vulnerabilities
We suggest that these adjustment decisions are informed by the trade-oﬀs groups make
between the individualmaterial costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent forms of internal and external
adjustment. Of course, these group-level vulnerabilities to speciﬁc policies are diﬃcult to
measure. To this end, we let respondents rate the diﬀerent policies within external and
internal adjustment (see Table ū) on a scale from ū (strongly oppose) to ů (stronglywelcome).
We the utilize the ratings of the policies displayed in each adjustment package as a proxy for
how vulnerable groups assume to be to the speciﬁc policies they have to choose between.
Figure ů displays boxplots of the average vulnerabilities to policies from within each
strategy in the sample. On average, groups feelmost vulnerable to a break-up of the Eurzone
and least likely to policies that would reduce the current account surplus. However, as we
will show below, these averages mask signiﬁcant variation when it comes to speciﬁc policy
options.
An obvious critique of our approach is that these subjective ratings are not necessarily
based on material considerations. For example, an employer association could oppose an
ūŮ
FієѢџђ ₅: Figure ů - Boxplots of average vulnerabilities to each adjustment strategy
increase of the minimumwage, not because it would hurt its members but because of a gen-
eral ideological opposition against government intervention in the free market. We address
this critique in twoways. First, we include variables that capture the general ideological dis-
position of groups (see below). Second, we also collect data on how ”objectively” exposed
groups are to diﬀerent policies by categorizing each group according to the Statistical Clas-
siﬁcation of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) and matching them
to economic data from the German Statistical Oﬃce. Based on this, we show that it’s not
ideology but mainly material considerations that inform policy ratings. The details of this
procedure are presented ins section Ű.
ŭ.ŭ Control Variables
In addition, we include a number of control variables. To check for the eﬀect of general eco-
nomic orthodoxy suggested by arguments about ordoliberalism, w include a survey item
that captures groups preferred level of state-intervention in the economy, ranging from ū
(large and encompassing interventions) to ů (no interventions at all). Furthermore, we in-
clude an item measuring general aĴitudes towards European integration ranging from ū
(European integration has gone too far) to ů (has not gone far enough). To account for the
variety of group types included in the sample, we include organization-type ﬁxed eﬀects
that capture if a group is an employer association, a professional association, a trade-union
ūů
or a social-policy group. Other control variables on group demographics include a measure
of group size and organizational capacities (measured as the number of full-time staﬀ em-
ployed by a group) as well as dummy variable that controls whether a group represents a
single sector (Ū) or a multitude of members active in diﬀerent economic areas (ū). Summary
statistics for all variables are in the appendix.
Ů Empirical Findings
What drives the crisis preferences of economic actors andhowdo they translate into politics?
Below, we discuss our ﬁndings along the four main hypothesis set out in section three.
Ů.ū Most groups support some form internal adjustment
Contrary to much existing literature, we expect that interest groups support internal adjust-
ment over other strategies as long as it comes in forms that beneﬁt their material interests.
Figure Ű supports this hypothesis. Considering only the most-liked options scenario, Panel
A depicts the policy-speciﬁc vulnerability proﬁles of the groups in our sample. A clear ma-
jority is situated in lower two quadrants. These groups should beneﬁt from the speciﬁc
forms of domestic expansion we suggest to them and thus prefer internal adjustment over
other strategies. Panel B shows that these vulnerabilities translate into the expected dis-
tribution of adjustment preferences. When we ask groups to choose their preferred crisis
response amongst packages that list their favoured policies from within each strategy, a
clear majority of almost ŰŲ% support internal adjustment.
Interviews amongst major economic interest-groups support this ﬁnding. A surpris-
ingly large number groups perceives the current-account surplus to be macro-economically
problematic. This includes all major trade unionsŰ but also a wide range of employer as-
sociations amongst them even clearly export-oriented ones such as the association of the
metal industry.ű While others rejected the notion that Germany’s large current-account sur-
plus did play a role in the Eurocrisis, even these groups stated that the German economy in
recent years clearly underperformed in terms of private and public investment and voiced
ŰInterview with Florian Moriĵ, DGB, Ŭų.ūū.ūű and Dierk Hirsche, verdi, ŪŰ.ūŬ.ūű, Berlin.
űInterview with Michael Stahl, Gesamtmetall, ŬŲ.ūū.ūű, Berlin.
ūŰ
FієѢџђ ₆: Figure Ű - Vulnerability Proﬁles and Adjustment Choices in Most-Liked Scenario
support for speciﬁc policies that would serve to counter this trend.Ų ų Instead of building
a uniﬁed front in favour of preserving export surpluses, most of the actors we interviewed
thus were in favour of some measures that would increase domestic demand and reduce
the surplus.
Ů.Ŭ Groups are divided on how to adjust internally
Our argument suggests that policy-speciﬁc vulnerabilities to internal adjustment lead groups
to diverge on the question how to achieve domestic expansion. Following their individual
material interests, groups should not only be in favour of some internal adjustment poli-
cies, they should also oppose others. This shouldmake it diﬃcult to build uniﬁed coalitions
support a rebalancing of the current account. Figure ű presents evidence in line with this
hypothesis. It displays density plots of the vulnerabilities to diﬀerent forms of internal ad-
justment policies across group types. While on average, most groups think that they could
beneﬁt from some form of internal adjustment, there are clear diﬀerences in their percep-
tion of diﬀerent alternatives. While, for example, a large majority of the trade unions, social
policy groups and professional associations in the sample would beneﬁt from a higher min-
imum wage or more spending on social welfare, most employer associations feel that this
ŲInterview with Reinhold Rickes, DSGV, ŭū.ūū.ūű and Eckhard RoĴer, VDA, Ŭū.ūū.ūű.
ųIn addition, several employer associations noted concern about the international implications of the large
surpluses, including exposure to shocks on foreignmarkets but also possible political repercussions if Germany
fails to reduce the surplus.
ūű
FієѢџђ ₇: Figure ű - Density plots of policy-speciﬁc vulnerabilities to diﬀerent forms of internal ad-
justment across diﬀerent group types.
would harm their interests. The picture looks exactly the opposite ways when it comes to
lower taxes for businesses.
This ﬁts well with what we learned from our interviews. All the trade unions we talked
to stressed the need to increase the minimum wages, to expand tariﬀ commitments and
to re-regulation of opt-out clauses and temporary employment contracts.ūŪ At the same
time, they ﬁercely rejected all forms of tax breaks for companies or eﬀorts to deregulate the
service sector in order to stimulate private investments - the last one being a concern that
they shared with representatives of the craft association. Many employer associations, on
the other hand, emphasized the expansive eﬀects of corporate tax cutsūū, the cut-down of
red tape in service industriesūŬ or the deregulation of credit provision.ūŭ At the same time,
most industry groups had not only fought the introduction of the minimum wage in ŬŪūŭ
but still stated that they would have to lobby against further aĴempts to re-regulate labour
contracts and tariﬀ commitments. One point that all groups agreed on and which is also
evident in Figure ű was the need for more public investment, especially for road and digital
infrastructure. However, opinions again diverged on the question how to ﬁnance these in-
vestments. While trade unions and craft associations demanded ﬁnancing through public
money and possibly new public debts, many employer associations insisted on the intro-
ūŪInterview with Florian Moriĵ, DGB, Ŭų.ūū.ūű and Dierk Hirsche, verdi, ŪŰ.ūŬ.ūű, Berlin.
ūūInterview with Michael Stahl, Gesamtmetall, ŬŲ.ūū.ūű, Berlin.
ūŬInterview with Eckhard RoĴer VDA, Ŭū.ūū.ūű.
ūŭInterview with Reinhold Rickes, DSGV, ŭū.ūū.ūű
ūŲ
duction of more private-public partnerships, which would also provide new investment
opportunities to large institutional investors.ūŮ
Ů.ŭ Financing ranks low on interest groups’ political agenda
Wepropose thatGermany’s response to the Eurocrisiswas shaped bydistributional conﬂicts
between diﬀerent economic actors. Compared to internal adjustment, we expect these con-
ﬂicts should be less pronouncedwhen it comes to diﬀerent ﬁnancing policies. While the pos-
sible tools for spurring domestic demand and investment are all well-known, with clearcut
distributive consequences and have been subject to long traditions of political struggles, the
distributive implications of ﬁnancing measures are rather abstract obscure and likely to be
widely diﬀused. We expect that this leads groups to be more indiﬀerent about and less po-
litically engaged. Figure Ų presents evidence in linewith this characterization. The left-hand
panel shows boxplots of the average share of policies groups state to be in indiﬀerent about
in each category. While on average, groups have deﬁnitive positions (meaning to either
support or reject them) on about ŲŪ% of the internal adjustment policies included in the sur-
vey, the same only true for about Űŭ% of ﬁnancing measures. The contrast between the two
strategies is even starker when it comes to their political salience (right-hand panel). When
asked how important the policies discussed in each category were for their political work,
almost ŲŪ% of the groups stated that they are important or rather important in the case of
internal adjustment. Only Ŭů% said the same for ﬁnancing policies. The rest characterize
these policies as unimportant or rather unimportant for their political work.
Similarly, while most groups we interviewed supported ﬁnancial rescue measures, the
speciﬁcities of the bailout regime or further steps to institutionalize transfers did rank very
low on their political agenda. ūů Even within the BDI, as the largest umbrella organisation
of the German economy, there was no formal consultation about the question of ﬁnancing
policies to produce an oﬃcial position. As a representative of a large umbrella associations
for business groups put it: ”The potential costs of these measures were never really thought
of or discussed. [...] There are simply ůŪ other topics that are of much greater importance
ūŮInterview with member of the Fraĵscher Kommission, Ūů.ūŬ.ūű and Dierk Hirsche, verdi, ŪŰ.ūŬ.ūű.
ūůE.g. Interview with Michael Stahl, Gesamtmetall, ŬŲ.ūū.ūű, Berlin.
ūų
FієѢџђ ₈: Figure Ų - Salience of Financing Policies
to our members.”ūŰ In line with this characterization, none of the policy-maker we talked
to could remember any consultations with interest groups about the nature of diﬀerent ﬁ-
nancing measures. ūű ūŲ
Ů.Ů Vulnerabilities to speciﬁc forms of internal adjustments drive support for
ﬁnancing
Due to the low salience of ﬁnancing policies, we expect interstate transfers to be an aĴractive
alternative for groups that are vulnerable to some forms of internal adjustment and that, at
the same time, want to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone. Figure ų starts investigating this
argument. Panel A shows the vulnerability proﬁles of diﬀerent interest groupswith regards
to their least-liked forms of internal and external adjustment. As expected, a large major-
ity of groups in this scenario is vulnerable to both strategies. Accordingly, as illustrated in
Panel B, support for domestic expansion drops to about ŭŪ% when we pressure groups to
choose between strategies listing their least-liked alternatives. Support for ﬁnancing, how-
ever, increases by more than ūů% compared to the most-liked scenario.
To analyse what drives decisions in the least-liked scenario more systematically, Table
Ŭ presents results of a logistic regression analysis of adjustment choices. The dependent
ūŰFinancing question were more important to trade unions. However, here they were mainly discussed with
reference to the eﬀects of the aĴached conditionality toworkers in deﬁcit countries and not somuchwith regards
to potential distributional eﬀects in Germany.
ūűInterview PMŬŭŬ, BMWi, Ŭų.ūū.ūű, Berlin
ūŲInterview PM ŬŭŮ,BMF, ŪŰ.ūŬ.ūű, Berlin.
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Tюяљђ ₂: Logit Regression - Policy Rating And Likelihood of Chosing Adjustment Strategies
Adjustment Choice - Least-Liked Packages
Internal Adjustment Financing
(ū) (Ŭ) (ŭ) (Ů)
Rating Least-Liked Internal Policy Ū.ůůŮ∗∗∗ Ū.Űūŭ∗∗∗ −Ū.ŮŰŲ∗∗∗ −Ū.ŮŰŪ∗∗
(Ū.ūůŬ) (Ū.ūųū) (Ū.ūŮų) (Ū.ūųų)
Rating Other Internal Policies (Av.) −Ū.Ŭųū −Ū.ůŮŮ∗ Ū.ŭŭű Ū.ŮŪŰ
(Ū.Ŭųų) (Ū.ŭūŪ) (Ū.Ŭůū) (Ū.ŭūŰ)
Rating Least Liked External −Ū.ŬŭŰ −Ū.Ŭūű Ū.ŪŰŮ Ū.ŬŮű
(Ū.Ŭŭŭ) (Ū.ŬŰŰ) (Ū.ŬŬŬ) (Ū.ŬůŲ)
Rating Other External Scenarios (Av.) −Ū.ŭŭů∗∗ −Ū.ŭūū∗ −Ū.ūŪū −Ū.ŪŪū
(Ū.ūŮů) (Ū.ūŰų) (Ū.ūůŪ) (Ū.ūűŬ)
Market Liberalism −Ū.ūůū Ū.Ūŭű
(Ū.ūųŬ) (Ū.ūűū)
European Integration Ū.Ūŭų Ū.ŭŬŲ∗∗
(Ū.ūŰŮ) (Ū.ūůŰ)
Group Size Ū.ūŮŰ Ū.ūůŪ
(Ū.ūűų) (Ū.ūůŬ)
Org. Type Fixed Eﬀects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
McFadden R-Square Ū.Ŭū Ū.ŭŰ Ū.ūŬ Ū.ŭŬ
Observations ūŬű ūŪŮ ūŬű ūŪŮ
Note: ∗p<Ū.ū; ∗∗p<Ū.Ūů; ∗∗∗p<Ū.Ūū
Ŭū
FієѢџђ ₉: Figure ų - Vulnerability Proﬁles and Adjustment Choices in the Least-Liked Scenario
variables take the value ū when the respective adjustment strategy (internal adjustment or
ﬁnancing) is selected and Ū otherwise. Our argument suggests that a group’s support for
internal adjustment is determined by its policy-speciﬁc vulnerability to diﬀerent alterna-
tives of internal adjustment. Model ū and Ŭ support this hypothesis. As evident from the
insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the variable measuring the average position on internal adjustment,
a group’s general vulnerability to internal adjustment has no impact on its likelihood to
support this strategy in its least-liked form. However, the higher groups rank the speciﬁc
internal adjustment policies suggested to them, the more likely they are to support domes-
tic expansion. On the other hand, groups that feel vulnerable to internal adjustment should
perceive ﬁnancing as an aĴractive alternative. Model ŭ and Ů ﬁnd support for this hypoth-
esis as well. Again, it is not a group’s general outlook on policies that could contribute to
more domestic demand and higher inputs but the expected eﬀects of the speciﬁc policies
under consideration that drive decisions. The more vulnerable groups feel to the suggested
forms of internal adjustment (i.e. the lower they rank them) the more likely they are to go
for ﬁnancing. All of these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for the
groups’ general ideological position towards market liberalism and European integration.
To facilitate the interpretation of these results, Figure ūŪ plots the predicted probabili-
ties of choosing internal adjustment and ﬁnancing across diﬀerent levels of vulnerabilities
towards the suggested form of domestic expansion. Groups that verymuch like the internal
adjustment policies thatwe suggest to them in the ”unpleasant options” scenario have a pre-
ŬŬ
FієѢџђ ₁₀: Figure ūŪ - Predicted probability of choosing internal adjustment vs. ﬁnancing
dicted probability of about űů % to select domestic expansion. Their predicted probability
of going for ﬁnancing, on the other hand, is less than ű%. Results are turned upside down
for groups that feel very vulnerable to the internal adjustment policies under consideration.
Now, the predicted probability of selecting internal adjustment lies only at about ūŪ%while
more the likelihood of supporting ﬁnancing rises to more than Ůů%. The probability for a
group to prefer ﬁnancing over other crisis responses is thus larger the more vulnerable it is
to the speciﬁc form of internal adjustment under consideration.
To avoid unpopular forms of internal adjustment, groups seem to be ready to engage in
costly interstate ﬁnancing. But why not simply let the monetary union fail? Our argument
suggests that ﬁnancing should be aĴractive for groups that are not only vulnerable to spe-
ciﬁc forms of internal adjustment but which also want to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone.
To investigate this argument, we rerun the logistic regression in model Ů, this time includ-
ing an interaction term between the perceived vulnerability towards internal and external
adjustment. Results presented in Figure ūū support our predictions. The eﬀect of being vul-
nerable to the internal adjustment policy under consideration on the likelihood of choosing
ﬁnancing is only positive and signiﬁcant when groups at the same time very much dislike
the proposed break-up scenario. It gets smaller and insigniﬁcant with waning opposition
Ŭŭ
FієѢџђ ₁₁: Figure ūū - Probability of choosing ﬁnance: Interaction of vulnerability towards external
and internal adjustment
towards external adjustment. However, note that more than űŪ% of our groups strongly
oppose their least-liked form of external adjustment and there is not a single group that
would actively welcome it. Strong opposition against a break-up of the union together with
policy-speciﬁc vulnerabilities towards speciﬁc forms of internal adjustment thus motivate
groups to support ﬁnancing as their preferred crisis response.
Summing up, we ﬁnd evidence for our main hypotheses. A majority of groups prefers
internal adjustment over other possible crisis responses as long as domestic expansion is
achieved through policies that serve their interests. The costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent inter-
nal adjustment policies, however, diﬀer across groups, resulting in distributional conﬂicts
about the speciﬁc form of internal adjustment. Together with the low salience of ﬁnancing
policies, this makes interstate transfers aĴractive. The more groups oppose speciﬁc forms
of internal adjustment, the more likely they are to support even their least-liked forms of
ﬁnancing. This is especially true as a large majority feels vulnerable to external adjustment.
ů Alternative Explanations
How well does the evidence presented so far hold up against existing explanations of the
politics of non-adjustment in Germany? We ﬁnd that group level preferences are more di-
ŬŮ
verse than both structuralist and constructivist explanations of Germany’s lack of adjust-
ment in the Eurocrisis would predict. At the same time, adjustment preferences seem to be
driven by the trade-oﬀs actor make between their subjective vulnerabilities to internal and
external adjustment. However, structuralist authorsmight point out our subjective vulnera-
bilities measures may not necessarily capture individual material considerations but diﬀer-
ences in the concerns for German export-led growth model. Similarly, more ideas-centred
scholars might note that diﬀerences in evaluations of diﬀerent policies could be driven by
diﬀerences in the ordoliberal creeds of diﬀerent groups.
To address both of these concerns, we analyse howwell objective data on thematerial ex-
posure of economic groups towards diﬀerent forms of adjustment predicts their subjective
vulnerabilities. To that end, we ﬁrst use the Statistical Classiﬁcation of Economic Activi-
ties in the European Community (NACE) to code groups according to the main economic
activities in which their members engage.ūų We then collect data on how exposed the so
categorized groups are to external adjustment and to what degree they could win or lose
from internal adjustment. First, to measure vulnerability to a break-up of the Eurozone we
use data on each group’s share of total output that is exported to other Eurozone members
(export dependence) from the input-output tables provided by the German statistical oﬃce
(Destatis, ŬŪūű). Second, to assess how much a group could beneﬁt from domestic expan-
sion we use the income elasticity of demand for the main goods it provides. This elasticity
measures to what degeree an increase in aggregate income translates into more demand for
a speciﬁc good or service. The higher the demand elasticity for a group, the more it should
thus be able gain from higher domestic demand. We make use of several empirical studies
(European Union, ŬŪŪű; European Union, ŬŪŪŲ) as well as the COICOP categorization of the
UN Statistics Division to construct an ordinal scale of demand elasticity that ranges from ū
for very inelastic goods (such as food and tobacco) to Ű for very elastic goods (e.g. ﬁnancial
services and personal care activities). The main costs of internal adjustment are likely to
stem from higher unit labour costs and an associated decrease of the competitiveness for
domestic ﬁrms. We measure vulnerability to internal adjustment as the wage sensitivity of
diﬀerent groups. This variable is based on the share of personnel costs in a sector’s total
ūųAt the two-digit-level, this categorization scheme allows me to diﬀerentiate between ųų distinct ﬁelds of
economic activity, of which ůů are represented in the German sample. For groups which represent actors from
more than one sector, we calculate independent variables by taking the unweigthed averages of all the sectors
present amongst their members.
Ŭů
costs. The higher this share, the more sensitive a group should be to an increase of domestic
wages. The variable is again based on the German input-output table (Destatis, ŬŪūű). As
wage-costs are only relevant for employers, we interact this variable with a dummy indicat-
ing whether a group represents ﬁrms’ interests or not. Again, we include control variables
accounting for the general ideological leaning of the group.
Figure ūŬ plots the results of a regression of these objective vulnerability measures on
the policy ratings we used as subjective measures of vulnerabilities. For each strategy, it
includes an average across all policies as well as two illustrative examples of other poli-
cies. Even though we use rather blunt macroeconomic measures, results are generally in
line with our expectations. As predicted by our argument, measures of material exposure
have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on subjective vulnerabilities, even after controlling for
ideological factors. Groups that produce goods with higher income elasticities of demand
rate internal adjustment policies more positively. This is true for the average across all inter-
nal adjustment policies but the eﬀects are especially strong for higher minimumwages and
a reduction of the VAT - both of which would increase the domestic income very directly.
Groups that are more wage sensitive and for which an increase of the domestic wage level
would thus translate into higher costs, on the other hand, rate internal adjustment policies
lower. However, the eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant for the most targeted policy to in-
crease of the wage level: an increase of theminimumwage. Our objective objectivemeasure
work less well when it comes to predicting subjective vulnerabilities towards a break-up of
the Eurozone. Groups that are more export dependent rate diﬀerent break-up scenarios
lower. However, the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. One likely reason is that all most
all groups in our sample feel highly vulnerable to a break-up of the monetary union, inde-
pendent of their direct exposure. This was also evident from our interviews. Even groups
that are clearly domestically oriented feared the general turmoil and insecurity of a break-
up. While, for example, the craft association has hardly any economic interests outside of
Germany, they worried that potential losses in the German ﬁnancial sector would translate
into credit crunches for their members.
However, material exposure still played a role in the evaluation of policies at the Euro-
pean level as well. Model ŭ in Figure ūŬ shows that export orientation does have a strong
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of groups’ ratings of ﬁnancing policies. Groups that export more to
Europe rate ﬁnancing policies on average higher and also evaluate the possibility of haircuts
ŬŰ
on debts that are held by oﬃcial or private lenders more positively. Again, the ﬁnding is
robust for the inclusion of ideological controls.
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Interviews with main interest groups substantiate these ﬁndings. First, whereas most
interest groups were very much aware of how diﬀerent crisis responses would aﬀect their
ŬŲ
members, concerns about the German growth model ranked low on their agenda. Con-
trary, to more structuralist theories, for example, even trade unions in the export-oriented
sector stressed the need for an increase of the domestic wage level and emphasized that
wage-moderation in recent years was much more driven by a weakening of trade-unions
bargaining position than by strategic eﬀorts to safeguard the sector’s competitiveness. Sec-
ond, while some of our interview partners would at points refer to ordoliberal arguments to
buĴress their interpretation of the Eurocrisis - especially when talking about the structural
problems of deﬁcit states - they would use these arguments in rather ﬂexible ways and did
not stick to ordoliberal frameworks when pressed about issues that were close to their ma-
terial interests. For example, almost none of the actors we talked to opposed the German
bailouts of ŬŪŪŲ or the provision of emergency credits to crisis countries in order to limit
contagion risks for the German banking sector even though these measures can hardly be
reconciled with the ordoliberal principle of economic self-responsibility. Similarly, interest
groups across the board welcomed the highly interventionist ﬁscal crisis package of ŬŪŪŲ.
As a representative of a ordoliberal business group put it: ”I think many business associa-
tions in principle agree with us about how the economy should be run. But when it comes
to political decisions, self-interest often trumps economic principles.”
Ű So What? Implications of Interest-Group Findings
So far, we have presented our ﬁndings on the drivers of interest group preferences in the
Eurocrisis. In this last section we turn to presenting some ideas on how these preferences
maĴered for the politics of non-adjustment and how our ﬁndings tie in with the existing
literature on surplus countries in the Eurocrisis.
Ű.ū Implications at the National Level
At the national level, distributional conﬂicts about the form of internal adjustment meant
that there was no concerted eﬀort amongst economic interest group to push towards an en-
compassing program for expanding the domestic economy. As a representative of a large
umbrella organization put it ”of course the main employer associations - for microeconomic
reasons - have to come out against such measures [authors note: higher minimumwage, re-
regulating contracts]. But then in tripartite exchanges trade unions say ’But that’s exactly
Ŭų
what we want.’ [...] Nobody is thinking about these things in an overall economic context.
So that’s what makes it diﬃcult.” As evident from our interviews and the survey data, most
groups claim that they did lobby in favor of some forms of internal adjustment - however,
they were very speciﬁc with regards to what forms and their eﬀorts often directly contra-
dicted each other. The gridlock on how to adjust internally between interest-groups, was
mirrored at the level of policy-makers, especially during the grand coalition after ŬŪūŭ. A
formermember of parliament for the SPD stated: ”It was always our position thatwe should
domore spending on infrastructure etc. and do something about the wage level - that’s also
what we did with the introduction of the minimum wage in ŬŪūŭ. But of course there are
limits to what you can do as long as the CDU governs.” Similarly, several policy-makers
with close ties to the CDU complained about the lack of the SPD’s willingness to take more
extensive measures to increase private investment after the crisis.ŬŪ Distributional conﬂicts
amongst economic interest groups thus produced important barriers against pursuing in-
ternal adjustment in Germany.
However, our results also indicate that economic groups were quite open to diﬀerent
options of interstate transfers. So why was the German approach to ﬁnancing still restric-
tive and tied to strong conditionality (Schneider and Slantchev, ŬŪūű; Bechtel et al., ŬŪūŮ)?
While we can only speculate, we illustrate one possible answer with representative public
opinion data from ŬŪūŪ-ūŭ. Figure ūŭ shows the German public shared the interest of eco-
nomic groups’ in keeping the EZ together. With the exception of Greece, a large majority
of voters was against any deﬁcit country leaving the common currency, even at the hight
of the crisis in ŬŪūū. Similarly, almost three quarters of the public thought that returning to
a national currency would be bad for Germany. While German voters thus did not show
much appetite for external adjustment, they were also deeply skeptical about interstate ﬁ-
nancing. As indicated by Figure ūŮ, more than űŪ percent were generally against ﬁnancial
support for highly indebted countries and opposition was even stronger when asked about
concrete measures such as the expansion of the European rescue funds and the introduc-
tion of Eurobonds. Importantly, this rejection was universal across party lines. Though the
level opposition diﬀered slightly, a majority of supporters of every party did respond neg-
atively to these ﬁnancing question. And ﬁnally, while ﬁnancing was of liĴle importance for
interest group, they did maĴer a great deal to voters. When asked in ŬŪūŭ, more than Ųů
ŬŪInterview with PM ŬŭŮ, BMF, ŪŰ.ūŬ.ūű, Berlin. Interview with MP Heribert Hirte (CDU), ŪŲ.ūŬ.ūű, Berlin.
ŭŪ
FієѢџђ ₁₃: The German public opposed external adjustment. Data from Politbarometer (ŬŪūū-ūŭ)
FієѢџђ ₁₄: The German public was skeptical about ﬁnancing. Data from Politbarometer (ŬŪūū-ūŭ)
percent noted that the management of the Eurocrisis would maĴer or even maĴer a lot for
their electoral decisions. The issue was thus more example than some domestic issues such
as for example tax policies (Polibarometer, ŬŪūŭ).
While our results have shown that distributional conﬂicts amongst interest groupsmade
internal adjustment a diﬃcult strategy to pursue, data onpublic opinion thus hints at the fact
that there also were liĴle electoral incentives for embracing a more encompassing and less
hesitant stance on interstate ﬁnancing - a perspective was also conﬁrmed in our own inter-
views with policymakers in Germany. Being jammed in-between interest groups blocking
internal adjustment and voters that opposed interstate ﬁnancing, thus provides a plausible
explanation for the German hawkishness in the crisis .
ŭū
Ű.Ŭ Implications at the International Level
At the international level, existing literature points out that surplus countries held very sim-
ilar positions during the crisis. While Germany was a key actor, its rejection of internal
adjustment and harsh stance on ﬁnancing was shared by countries like Finland, Austria
or the Netherlands (Armingeon and Cranmer, ŬŪūű; MaĴhijs, ŬŪūŰb). This homogeneity of
positions facilitated coalitions building amongst creditor states and added to their political
leverage (Schimmelfennig, ŬŪūůb). Our argumentmayhelp tomake sense of this homogene-
ity. If distributional conﬂicts around the speciﬁcities of internal adjustment were similar in
other surplus states, this would add to our understanding of why none of these countries
broke rank and called for a more balanced approach to adjustment.
Against this background Figure ūů and ūŰ present ﬁndings from interest-group surveys
inAustria and theNetherlands. Taken together, we collected another ŬŬŭ responses (NL: ūūŰ
(response rate Ŭų%); AT: ūŪů (response rate ŬŰ%)) using the same method as in Germany.
As expected, the paĴens are very similar across these countries. As in Germany, a large
majority of economic groups in Austria and the Netherlands would prefer their most-liked
form of internal adjustment over any other crisis response. However, as before support for
internal hinges on its speciﬁc policy content . Amajority of groups actually prefers ﬁnancing
when they are confronted with trade-oﬀs between their least liked forms of adjustment.
Finally, ūŰ shows that support for ﬁnancing is driven by the groups’ vulnerability to internal
adjustment. The stronger a group opposes its least-liked form of internal adjustment, the
larger its probability to support ﬁnancing.
We interpret this as evidence that our argument holds across diﬀerent surplus countries.
Distributional conﬂicts about the how to expand the domestic economy made internal ad-
justment politically diﬃcult to achieve in all creditor states. While the macroeconomic ef-
fects of spurring domestic demand in the Netherlands or Austria arguably would not have
had much of an eﬀect for the Eurzone as a whole, this ﬁnding helps us to explain why none
of the other surplus countries challenged Germany’s of towards internal adjustment.
ŭŬ
FієѢџђ ₁₅: Adjustment Choices in Austria and the Netherlands
FієѢџђ ₁₆: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Internal Adjustment and Financing in Austria and the
Netherlands
ŭŭ
ű Conclusion
The debate about the German current-account surplus and its role for the emergence and
management of the Eurocrisis has long turned into one of the evergreens of EU politics. At
the same time, many outside observers are puzzled: why would a country facing a lack of
domestic demand and investment refuse to share the costs of adjustment in the Eurozone, if
doing so could not only foster its own economy but also hush a diverse choir of international
critics?
Our paper suggests that one reason for this lies in rather profane politics. Leverag-
ing original survey data and in-depths interviews with representatives of economic inter-
est groups, we show that German non-adjustment is partly rooted in distributive struggles
about the design of possible adjustment policies. Although we ﬁnd general support for
strengthening domestic demand, diﬀerent groups disagree about how to achieve this goal.
Together with a broad consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, the polarization on
the speciﬁcities of internal adjustment has made ﬁnancing the politically most viable strat-
egy.
Our ﬁndings have a number of political and theoretical implications. First, our evidence
suggests that the German current-account surplus is less structural than existing explana-
tions assume. Some authors propose that the common currency is doomed to fail since Ger-
man export-orientation will always lead to current-account imbalances (Höpner and LuĴer,
ŬŪūŮb). Others think that its impossible to unite countries with fundamentally diﬀerent eco-
nomic beliefs and traditions into amonetary union (Brunnermeier et al., ŬŪūŰ). We agree that
both strands of literature pinpoint to important issues. However, our ﬁndings also suggest
that it would be possible to arrive at a more balanced current-account by designing pack-
ages of internal adjustment that garner broad-based political support. As we show above,
this is by no means an easy task and requires diﬃcult compromises. But there is nothing
that dictates Germany to run surpluses at the current magnitude. For the Eurozone, this
is good news. Second, at least form the perspective of economic interest group, there is
political room to manoeuvre to engage in further ﬁnancing measures such as haircuts on
outstanding debt or even more institutionalized forms of interstate transfers. Of course,
here voter preferences and the way they are perceived by German parties are going to be a
ŭŮ
crucial andmaybe limiting factor. But at least from important economic interest groups, we
would expect liĴle resistance against further ﬁscal integration.
Finally, our ﬁndings also have important implications for studying the political econ-
omy of balance-of-payment crises and global imbalances more generally. So far, research
on these issues has been characterized by a one-sided focus on the role of deﬁcit states.
However, our ﬁndings from Germany suggest that distributional conﬂicts within surplus
countries play a crucial role in the build-up andmaintenance of imbalances. Understanding
these conﬂicts and how they play into the stickiness of large current-account surpluses in
more detail, will be crucial for arriving at a beĴer understanding of the drivers of global
ﬁnancial imbalances.
ŭů
Ų Appendix
Ų.ū Additional Figures and Tables
s
Tюяљђ ₃: Summary Statistics - Subjective Vulnerabilities
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Rating Int. Adj. Average ūŭŪ ŭ.Ŭű Ū.ŮŮ ū.ŲŪ Ů.ŮŪ
Rating Higer Wages ūŭū ŭ.ŪŬ ū.Ŭū ū ů
Rating More Welfare Spending ūŭŬ Ŭ.ůŲ ū.ūű ū ů
Rating Public Investment ūŭŬ Ů.ŭŲ Ū.űŪ ū ů
Rating Lower CIT ūŭū ŭ.ŭŮ ū.Ūų ū ů
Rating Lower VAT ūŭŬ ŭ.Ūů Ū.Ųű ū ů
Rating Financing Average ūŭŪ Ŭ.ŲŪ Ū.Űū ū.ŬŪ Ů.ŰŪ
Rating Emergency Credits ūŭŪ ŭ.ŮŬ Ū.ųŪ ū ů
Rating EU Unempl. ūŭū Ŭ.Űů ū.Ūų ū ů
Rating Gov. Debt Cuts ūŭŬ Ŭ.űŮ ū.Ūů ū ů
Private Debt Cuts ūŭū Ŭ.Űŭ ū.Ūů ū ů
Rating ECB Asset Purchases ūŭū Ŭ.ůų ū.Ūū ū ů
Rating Break-Up Average ūŭŪ ū.ųŮ Ū.ŲŬ ū.ŪŪ Ů.ŪŪ
Rating DCs leave ūŭū Ŭ.Ŭű ū.ūű ū ů
Rating North/ South Divide ūŭŪ Ŭ.ŪŰ Ū.ųų ū Ů
Rating Germany leaves ūŭŪ ū.Ůų Ū.Ųű ū ů
Tюяљђ ₄: Summary Statistics - Objective Variables & Controls
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Export Intensity ūŭŮ Ū.Ūŭ Ū.Ūů Ū.ŪŪ Ū.ūų
Share of Imported Inputs ūŭŭ Ű.ųŬ ů.űų Ū.ŪŪ ŭŭ.Ŭŭ
Income Elasticity of Demand ūŭŭ ŭ.ŲŰ ū.ŮŮ ū Ű
Personnel Costs/ Total Costs ūŭŮ ŭŮ.Űŭ ūű.ŭŮ ů.ųů ūŪŪ.ŪŪ
Pro European AĴitudes ūŪų ŭ.Űű ū.Ūů ū ů
Pro Market AĴitudes ūŪű ŭ.ŭų ū.Ūū ū ů
Organisation Staﬀ Size/ ūŪ ūŭŮ ųŰ.ųű ŭųŬ.ŰŰ Ū.ŪŪ ŭ,ŰŪŪ.ŪŪ
ŭŰ
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